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Given an increasingly complex web of financial pressures on providers, studies have examined how
the hospitals' overall financial health affect different aspects of hospital operation.  In our study, we
analyze this issue focusing on hospital access and quality by introducing an important aspect of the
financial incentives, soft budget constraints (SBC), that takes into account both hospital's current and
past financial health as well as their expected financial outlook (i.e., whether there is a sponsoring
organization to bail them out).  We develop a conceptual framework of SBC by considering the resultant
incentives on cost control and quality improvement innovations; and examine the effect of SBC on
the following aspects of access and quality: safety net service survival and AMI mortality rates.  We
find that  hospitals with softer budget constraints are less likely to shut down safety net services.  In
addition, hospitals with softer budget constraints appear to have better mortality outcomes, suggesting
that the reduced incentive to engage in cost control innovation as the result of SBC outweighs the dampening
effect of quality improvement innovation.
Yu-Chu Shen












Over the past several decades, the US healthcare system has undergone signi￿cant structural
changes and payment system reforms, creating an increasingly complex web of ￿nancial
pressures on providers. These ￿nancial pressures have resulted in shrinking hospital margins
in the past decade: the percent of general acute hospitals reporting negative income grew
from 21 percent in 1995 to 29 percent in 2004,1 and Medicare margins fell by 50 percent
between 1997 and 2001 (MedPAC, 2005). The shrinking margins have prompted concerns
about ￿nancial stress leading to worse access and quality of care for patients.
An extensive literature focuses on how ￿nancial stress a⁄ects hospital operations, in-
cluding several studies that have examined how hospitals￿past and current pro￿t margins
a⁄ect quality of care as measured by safety events and mortality (Encinosa and Bernard,
2005; Bazzoli et al 2007). While current and past ￿nancial circumstances can be important,
they do not fully capture future ￿nancial health, such as whether the hospital can expect
to be bailed out from future troubles. Yet it is the expectation of future circumstances
and the present value of those future revenue streams that shape key current choices about
operations.
In this study, we propose another way to understand how a hospital￿ s ￿nancial health
can a⁄ect access and quality in patient care by introducing the concept of a soft budget
constraint (SBC), which takes into account potential future pro￿t by considering whether
the hospital will be bailed out by a sponsoring organization (such as government). Both
theory and empirical evidence suggest that SBCs often play an important role in explaining
organizational behavior (Kornai, Maskin, and Roland 2003), including di⁄erences among
otherwise similar organizations. Yet few researchers have referenced this theory to help
understand the ￿black box￿of healthcare organization decision making.
The objective of this paper is twofold: (1) to develop a conceptual framework and empir-
1Authors￿tabulation of Medicare hospital cost reports (HCRIS).
1ical metrics of soft budget constraints for the US hospital industry; and (2) to analyze the
e⁄ect of soft budget constraints on hospital access and quality. For access measures, we ex-
amine the survival rates of safety net services, including inpatient and outpatient substance
abuse services, HIV/AIDS services, and emergency departments. For quality measures,
we examine time-speci￿c risk adjusted mortality rates among Medicare AMI patients. We
speci￿cally examine the following hypotheses derived from our conceptual framework:
1. Hospitals with harder budget constraints have a higher risk of shutting down safety
net services.
2. If important aspects of hospital quality are noncontractible and potentially damaged
by cost control, then softer budget constraints will be associated with higher quality (lower
AMI mortality rates).
Our primary data sources are the American Hospital Association annual surveys and hos-
pital cost reports from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, as well as Medicare
fee-for-service claims for AMI outcomes. Our sample includes all general, acute, short-stay
hospitals between 1990 and 2004. The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We review
the literature pertaining to the relationship between hospital ￿nancial health and access and
quality in section 2. We present the conceptual framework of SBCs and the theoretical
predictions regarding the e⁄ect of SBCs on access and quality in section 3. We describe the
data and the empirical models in section 4. We present the empirical results in section 5
and conclude in section 6.
2 Background Literature
Most studies analyzing the relationship between ￿nancial pressure and hospital behavior
use changes in insurer markets, mostly Medicare payment policy, as a measure of ￿nancial
pressure. In general, the literature has found a signi￿cant negative e⁄ect of payment cuts on
patient outcomes in the earlier period when Medicare transitioned from cost reimbursement
2to the Prospective Payment System (Staiger and Gaumer 1992; Cutler 1995; Shen 2003),
but only a small to nonexistent e⁄ect on patient outcomes when Medicare imposed uniform
rate cuts across hospitals in the 1997 Balanced Budget Act (Volpp et al 2005; Clement et al
2007; Lindrooth et al 2007). Financial pressure from managed care has also been studied
extensively, with mixed results regarding its e⁄ect on patient care (see Morrisey 2001 for
a review). A few studies directly examine a hospital￿ s own ￿nancial health and its impact
on patient safety. Encinosa and Bernard (2005), using HCUP data from Florida hospitals
between 1996 and 2000, found that a lower operating margin was associated with increased
odds of adverse patient safety events. Bazzoli et al (2007), using HCUP data from 11 states
between 1994 and 2000, found a weaker relationship between pro￿t margin and quality of
care, but noted that hospitals in the lowest 2 quartiles of the cash￿ ow-to-total revenue ratio
have worse outcomes for some but not all quality indicators.
Whether researchers use external ￿nancial pressure from insurer markets or a hospital￿ s
internal ￿nancial health as the key independent variable, the common theme in this literature
has been the focus on current or past ￿nancial information. However, many key current
choices about hospital operations (such as provision of safety net services or implementation
of innovations) are shaped by the expectation of future circumstances and the present value
of those future revenue streams, which may not be fully revealed in past pro￿t margins.
Our study considers an alternative ￿nancial measure to examine these important access and
quality issues. We introduce the concept of soft budget constraints and discuss studies
that have directly or indirectly incorporated SBCs in assessing hospital behavior. We will
develop the SBC concept more fully in the next section.
An organization enjoys a SBC if it can expect to continue to operate when expenditures
consistently exceed revenues, because some sponsoring organization, such as the government
or the parent company, provides funds to prevent going out of business (Kornai 1986).
Organizations expecting bail-outs have less incentive to be e¢ cient and strive for innovation,
although their resilience in the face of ￿nancial di¢ culty also may help to guarantee supply
3of a valuable service. Organizations enjoying SBCs also often su⁄er from a ￿ ratchet e⁄ect￿ :
in good times, their surpluses are diverted or expropriated for other uses by the sponsoring
organizations.
Some previous researchers have shown that expropriation a⁄ects hospital behavior (e.g.,
Duggan 2000), although none have studied the direct SBC e⁄ect on service provision and
patient outcomes. Baicker and Staiger (2005) show that a signi￿cant share of federal funds
intended to supplement resources for safety-net hospitals was actually appropriated by state
and local governments for other uses. The Disproportionate Share (DSH) funds that were put
to their intended use, rather than diverted, did help to improve population health (through
reductions in infant and post-heart attack mortality). Duggan (2000) shows that in Cal-
ifornia, local governments decreased their subsidies to government-owned hospitals almost
dollar-for-dollar with the increased state revenues those hospitals received from the DSH
program. In light of this expropriation, California government hospitals saw no change in
total revenues, despite continuing to treat the least pro￿table patients.
These studies are suggestive that SBCs and expropriation of ￿nancial surplus are indeed
important phenomena a⁄ecting hospitals. However, no study that we are aware of explicitly
examines the relationship between a metric for SBC and hospitals￿service o⁄erings and
quality of care, although theory suggests that these are aspects of hospital operations that
may be signi￿cantly shaped by the softness of a hospital￿ s budget constraint.
3 Conceptual Framework
In this section, we lay out the framework that explains how the SBC concept takes into
account a hospital￿ s expectation of its future ￿nancial circumstances and the likely e⁄ect of
this expectation on hospital access and quality. Our simple model builds on the model of
noncontractible innovations in Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997; hereafter HSV) and model of
SBCs in Eggleston (2008). Our contribution is to re-frame these elements to derive empiri-
4cally testable hypotheses about how softness of budget constraints in￿ uences cost control and
quality of services, abstracting from (and empirically controlling for) other aspects shaping
hospital behavior such as ownership. We ￿rst introduce the players and the decision stages,
and discuss the key components of the theoretical model. We then proceed to de￿ne SBCs
formally, and present theoretical predictions of how SBCs shape innovation incentives. It is
these theoretical predictions that we test empirically in the remainder of the paper.
3.1 Players and timeline
At Date 0, the manager, M, of a health service facility such as a hospital agrees to provide
payer(s) a basic package of health services of quality B0 for payment P0. The services cost
the manager C0 to provide. At Date 0.5, M develops ideas (blueprints) to control costs, e,
and to improve quality, i. These changes in service o⁄erings or care processes were neither
proscribed nor required in the initial contract; they were either technically noncontractible
ex ante (at date 0) or not considered important or cost-e⁄ective to stipulate explicitly. For
example, hospitals frequently are included in insurer networks without a speci￿c contract
that requires provision of a long list of safety net services or speci￿c threshold of care quality.
Likewise, although city or county hospitals have an obligation to provide indigent care, the
speci￿cs of the services are not written in contracts.2 Stipulating exact care processes, sta¢ ng
expectations, and other details of hospital management are neither practical nor common.
Thus hospital managers have considerable scope for changing operations to improve quality
and/or reduce cost.
At Date 1, M and the owner(s) and payer(s) renegotiate over the proposed changes (in-
novation blueprints), agreeing to split the associated surplus S (e;i) according to bargaining
power and market conditions: the owner(s) and payer(s) appropriate fraction (1 ￿ m) of the
surplus (0 ￿ m ￿ 1), and M retains mS. At Date 1.5, M chooses implementation e⁄ort
that determines the probability that innovations e and i are successfully implemented. At
2Communication with Gene Marie O￿ Connell, CEO of San Fransicsco General Hospital.
5Date 2, the payer(s) and owners assess the performance of the manager and current market
conditions, and decide whether or not to close the facility (e.g. hospital) that M manages. If
the innovations have not been implemented successfully, the facility may continue to provide
the basic service ￿yielding positive bene￿ts Vo to the payer(s)/owner(s) and Uo to M ￿or
be closed. In the event of closure, M experiences a loss of UL < 0 (representing reputation
losses and costs associated with ￿nding a new job). We summarize the ￿ ow of events in
Table 1.
3.2 Noncontractible e⁄orts and innovation
Following Eggleston (2008), we assume that when the manager exerts e⁄ort a to turn ideas
e and i into reality, implementation is successful with probability ￿(a). Assume a 2 [0;1);
￿(0) = 0; ￿(1) = 1; ￿
0 (a) > 0; and ￿
00 (a) < 0. E⁄ort a is observable but not contractible
and has a constant marginal cost of 1.
E⁄ort costs are e + i and result in blueprints. The manager bears costs directly. Cost
innovations reduce costs by c(e), so if e is implemented successfully costs are reduced to
C = C0 ￿ c(e): As in HSV, we assume diminishing returns to cost control: c(0) = 0;
c0(0) = 1; c0 > 0; c00 < 0.
Quality, initially B0, depends on both cost control and quality improvement. Changes
that reduce service costs ￿such as recruiting less expensive and less quali￿ed sta⁄ or lax
infection control ￿may reduce quality; this damage is captured by the function b(e). Quality
innovations, net of their associated costs, increase quality by ￿(i). Thus if e and i are
successfully implemented, quality B becomes
B = B0 ￿ b(e) + ￿(i): (1)
As in HSV, we assume b(0) = 0; b0 ￿ 0; b00 ￿ 0; ￿(0) = 0; ￿
0(0) = 1; ￿
0 > 0; and ￿
00 < 0.
The total surplus generated by ideas not included in the original contract is S = ￿(i) ￿
6b(e) + c(e). Following HSV we assume ￿b0(e) + c0(e) > 0 over the relevant range (that is,
quality damage from cost control o⁄sets, but never completely outweighs, the e¢ ciencies
associated with appropriate cost control). The socially e¢ cient outcome would be achieved

















The socially e¢ cient levels of cost and quality innovations, e￿ and i￿, and implementation
e⁄ort, a￿, equate their expected net contributions to social welfare with their marginal cost
of 1.
However, when innovations are not contractible (or, for various reasons, omitted from
the contract even if technically contractible), M￿ s choices of e￿, i￿, and a￿ depend on M￿ s
expectation of a reward for excellent performance or of a ￿bail out￿despite poor performance.
In other words, incentives for innovation depend on the level of appropriation of surplus
(magnitude of m) and the expected softness of the budget constraint.
3.3 De￿ning the softness of budget constraint
With probability (1 ￿ ￿(a)), M￿ s e⁄ort a was insu¢ cient to turn the promised changes e
and i into reality, and performance is weak. Can M rationally expect to be able to continue
business as usual despite this performance (i.e., does M face a soft budget constraint)?
The owners and payers, through refusing to contract, may force closure of the facility.
The liquidation value, L > 0, ￿ uctuates with variations in the market value of the land,
equipment, brand/reputation, and all other associated nonhuman assets. One can think of
L as being drawn from a probability distribution F(L).
Let ￿ be the expected probability that Vo > L, the ex post probability that the facility
7continues to operate despite weak performance:
￿ ￿ Pr[Vo > L]: (3)
￿ represents the softness of the budget constraint. If ￿ = 1, the budget constraint is ex-
tremely soft: the facility never faces closure despite M￿ s low e⁄ort, since Vo > L always holds
true. At the other extreme if ￿ = 0, the budget constraint is very hard: failure to implement
innovations always leads to closure (even if the manager exerted considerable e⁄ort but was
unlucky), since L > Vo for every realization of L. More generally, the provider will expect
some probability of continuation, 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1.
In equilibrium, the manager￿ s expectation ￿ equals the true likelihood of a bail out versus
closure. For example, perhaps the manager of a large teaching hospital that is a member of
a hospital system would be justi￿ed to expect that poor ￿nancial performance in one or two
years would not immediately lead to closure. In contrast, equally poor performance at a small
non-teaching, non-system hospital in a competitive urban market might be associated with
high probability of closure. The latter hospital manager faces a harder budget constraint.
This suggests that an appropriate metric for a hospital￿ s softness of budget constraint
(￿) would be the inverse of the probability of closure (1￿￿). Our empirical analysis employs
this proxy for SBCs.
3.4 How SBCs Shape Innovation Incentives
SBCs dampen the manager￿ s ex ante incentive to invest in innovations. This e⁄ect is salutory
if hard budget constraints would have induced over-investment, such as excessive cost control
and its associated damage to noncontractible quality. To see how the simple model predicts
8this result, consider that M￿ s overall expected payo⁄ is
U = Po ￿ Co ￿ e ￿ i ￿ a + ￿(a)(mS + Uo)
+(1 ￿ ￿(a))[￿Uo + (1 ￿ ￿)UL]: (4)
M chooses innovations and implementation e⁄ort according to
￿(a)m[￿b
0(e) + c
0(e)] = 1; (5)
￿(a)m￿
0 (i) = 1; and
￿
0 (a)[mS + (1 ￿ ￿)(Bo ￿ UL)] = 1:
Our focus is on how M￿ s choices of e and i are shaped by the softness of budget constraint,
￿.
Proposition 1 (SBCs and cost control) Softer budget constraints are associated with
less cost control: de
d￿ < 0.







d￿ [￿b0(e) + c0(e)]
￿(￿)[￿b00(e) + c00(e)]
< 0:
The denominator is negative by the second order condition and the numerator is positive
because ￿
0 (a) da
d￿ < 0 (see Eggleston 2008) and by assumption ￿b0(e) + c0(e) > 0.
Proposition 1 predicts that hospitals facing softer budget constraints will be associated
with less aggressive cost control and generally higher costs. The full range of cost control
e⁄orts may be di¢ cult for researchers to observe and quantify. One way to test the prediction
is to assess the impact of SBCs on service o⁄erings which are potentially contractible but not
actually contracted upon. If SBCs are associated with continually o⁄ering services known
to be generally unpro￿table, then it is even more likely that SBCs would be associated with
9other, less quanti￿able cost containment e⁄orts, including those that potentially damage
hard-to-observe aspects of quality.
The association between softness of budget constraints and lower cost control derives
from a model that is agnostic about why payers and owners allow a soft budget constraint
equilibrium to persist. The logic of the proposition is only further reinforced, however, if one
considers that providing access to unpro￿table safety net services is a common justi￿cation
for softening of budget constraints. In other words, a hospital￿ s provision of safety net
services can be used to argue for giving the hospital itself a ￿nancial ￿safety net￿to prevent
closure.
Unlike the prediction that SBCs are associated with higher costs, the impact of SBCs on
quality is less clear-cut.
Proposition 2 (SBCs and quality) The impact of softness of budget constraint on qual-
ity is theoretically ambiguous:dB





￿ ￿, then dB
d￿ > 0 (soft budget
constraints are protective of quality when there is large scope for cost control to compromise
quality).
Proof. Quality is B = B0 ￿ b(e) + ￿(i): We previously showed that de
d￿ < 0. Thus soft-

























10SBCs increase costs and lower quality innovations, but also reduce damage to noncon-
tractible quality from overly zealous cost control. The net impact on service quality is
ambiguous. Two empirically testable implications follow. First, the magnitude of the asso-
ciation between softness of budget constraint and quality is likely to be smaller than that
between SBCs and cost control, because of the o⁄setting e⁄ect of decreased quality im-
provement innovations. Second, SBCs are protective of quality only when SBCs signi￿cantly
impact cost control ( de
d￿ < 0) and when there is large scope for damage to quality from
noncontractible aspects of cost control (￿b(e) is large). We use the example of heart attack
mortality as an aspect of quality that might be particularly appropriate for empirically mea-
suring noncontractible hospital quality and testing its association with softness of budget
constraints.
In sum, we can de￿ne softness and hardness of budget constraints relative to the opti-
mal probability of closure, ￿￿; budget constraints are soft when equilibrium ￿ is such that
1 ￿ ￿ > ￿￿. SBCs imply low implementation e⁄ort a (da




d￿ < 0) and ine¢ ciently low cost control e⁄orts (e < e￿; see
Eggleston 2008). Conversely, a budget constraint is said to be hard when ￿￿ > ￿ ￿ 0. Overly
hard budget constraints stimulate high implementation e⁄ort (a > a￿), high likelihood of
realizing the surplus from innovations (￿ > ￿
￿), and excessively high cost control (e > e￿)
which can damage di¢ cult-to-observe aspects of quality. Propositions 1 and 2 summarize
our theoretical predictions.
4 Data and Statistical Methods
4.1 Data sources and Sample
Our primary data sources are the American Hospital Association (AHA) annual surveys and
hospital cost reports from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) between
111990 and 2005. The two data sources together provide rich information on hospital ￿nancial,
utilization, and service characteristics. In addition, to construct the SBC metric, we obtained
hospital closure data (1990-2000) that identi￿es the year and nature of hospital closure from
the National Bureau of Economic Research, where the underlying data is the AHA surveys.
For the AMI mortality analysis, we obtained hospital-speci￿c risk-adjusted AMI mortality
rates between 1994 and 2004 from Jonathan Skinner of Dartmouth College. The underlying
data source for the mortality rates is the Medicare MEDPAR data.
We further supplement the hospital data with other information to capture relevant mar-
ket characteristics. These include the area wage index from the PPS Impact File, population
characteristics from the Area Resource File, economic conditions from the County Business
Patterns, county property tax from the Census of Government Finance, and a variable-radius
hospital competition measure (Her￿ndahl index, provided by Glenn Melnick of USC).
As discussed in the conceptual framework, we use the inverse of expected probability of
closure as a proxy for the degree of budget constraint softness. We exclude the following
hospitals to develop a ￿clean￿metric for SBCs in the analytic sample. First, we exclude hos-
pitals that converted ownership to avoid the potential confounding of ownership conversion
with closure. Second, we exclude hospitals that were acquired by another hospital (instead
of shut down completely). Descriptive analysis suggests that acquired hospitals tend to be
￿nancially better o⁄ before the acquisition than the average hospital and are quite di⁄er-
ent from hospitals that were shut down completely. Since SBCs refer to organizations that
receive infusion of funds to stay a￿ oat, not organizations rewarded for above-average per-
formance, excluding acquired hospitals when estimating the SBC metric is most consistent
with our conceptual framework.
To test Proposition 1, we examine whether SBCs are associated with lower hazard of
shutting down safety net services. For this service survival analysis, our sample includes all
general, acute, short-stay hospitals between 1990 and 2005 with one exception: we exclude
hospitals that were shut down as identi￿ed in our closure data (i.e., we only estimate service
12survival among hospitals that continue to operate beyond 2000). Our analysis utilizes all 16
years of information for all services except AIDS treatment: AIDS service data are available
only for the 1994-2005 period. Since we are concerned with adoption and shut down decisions,
panel data spanning 16 years should provide us with su¢ cient information to carry out the
analysis.
For empirical test of Proposition 2, we examine the association between SBCs and quality
using the risk-adjusted AMI mortality data as a proxy for noncontractible quality. In that
analysis, our sample includes all general, acute, short-stay hospitals between 1994 and 2004.
As for the service survival analysis, we exclude hospitals that were shut down completely
before 2000. In addition, we exclude hospitals with fewer than 20 AMI admissions in a year
because CMS regulations stipulate that the hospital-level mortality rates are only publicly
released for hospitals with at least 20 AMI admissions per year.
4.2 Statistical methods overview
Our empirical model consists of two stages. In the ￿rst stage, we develop a SBC index
for each hospital. Then in the second stage we estimate the e⁄ect of SBCs on access and
quality. For the access analysis, we estimate the e⁄ect of SBCs on safety net service survival
using discrete-time proportional hazard models (Prentice and Gloeckler 1978; Baker 2001;
Baker and Phibbs 2002; Shen 2008). The SBC index we develop in the ￿rst stage becomes
the key independent variable in the discrete time proportional hazard models. Our survival
analysis estimates the e⁄ect of SBCs on shut down rates of four safety net services: inpatient
substance abuse treatment, outpatient substance abuse treatment, HIV/AIDS treatment,
and emergency departments. For the quality analysis, we estimate the e⁄ect of SBCs on
AMI mortality rates using generalized least square models (Greene, 2003; McClellan and
Staiger 2000; Shen 2002). The AMI mortality measures we analyze include 30-day, 90-day,
and 1-year mortality rates.
For both the access and quality analyses, we use boot strapping methods to obtain
13standard errors corrected to account for the fact that the SBC measure is derived from the
￿rst stage regression. We also compare the estimated e⁄ect of our SBC index on access and
quality with the estimated e⁄ect of pro￿t margin to contrast the two di⁄erent concepts of
hospital ￿nancial health.
The rest of the methods section is divided as follows. First, we present the analytical
model used to come up with the SBC metric. Second, we provide more detail on the
analytical models for the service survival analysis. Lastly, we describe the estimation models
for the mortality analysis, including how the risk-adjusted mortality rates are aggregated to
the hospital level.
4.2.1 Estimating the softness of budget constraints
While pro￿t margins in the current and previous years are one important component of
overall ￿nancial health and thus factor into measuring the softness of budget constraint,
the key di⁄erence between the pro￿t margin and SBC measures is that the latter takes
into account hospitals￿expected future ￿nancial outlook in the face of uncertainty about
performance, as discussed in the conceptual framework. A quintessential measure of a hard
budget constraint is whether the organization risks going out of business when it does not
meet performance expectations (Kornai 1986; Kornai, Maskin, and Roland 2003). We use
data on hospital closures through 2000, available from the NBER, to construct this measure
of SBC with the following steps. First, we estimate a model of determinants of closure based
on prior literature (Sloan et al 2003; Chakravarty et al 2006) and our conceptual framework.
In particular, we estimate a probit model of the probability of closure in a given year as a
function of the following hospital and market characteristics3:
￿ Hospital internal ￿nancial health: these include the current and previous year￿ s op-
erating margins, as well as an indicator for whether the hospital reports negative net
3All continiuous variables are normalized so that they represent deviations from the yearly average. This
allows us to project the SBC measures for 2001-2005 without worrying about which year is used as the
reference year.
14income in the current and previous year;
￿ Hospital organizational characteristics such as ownership (not-for-pro￿t, for-pro￿t, gov-
ernment), location (urban, rural), teaching status, and system membership;
￿ Hospital size as measured by total inpatient and outpatient volumes;
￿ Hospital external ￿nancial environment: these include county property tax per capita
as well as interactions with hospital ownership. The idea of including the county
property tax variable is that counties with higher property taxes might be able to
provide better ￿nancial cushions to public hospitals and have potential spillover e⁄ects
on other hospitals in the same county.
￿ Demand for health care: following Chakravarty et al (2006), we try to capture demand
for health care by using the elderly population as our measure of exogenous demand
shifts. The elderly are heavy consumers of health care, so changes in the percent of
elderly population should be highly correlated with changes in the demand for hospital
services, which in turn would in￿ uence decisions about hospital closure.
￿ Other market characteristics: these include county population and per capita income,
percent of for-pro￿t and government hospitals within a 15-mile radius of a hospital￿ s
zip code, and a hospital competition measure (Her￿ndahl index).
Second, using the models￿coe¢ cients, we construct the predicted probability of closure for
1990-2005 for all hospitals that are in continuous operation between 1990 and 2000. Note
that for 2001-2005, we are essentially predicting out of sample since closure information
is only available through 2000. Hospitals with higher predicted probability of closure,
conditional on a given ￿nancial pressure or market competitiveness, are considered to be
facing a harder budget constraint. We take the complement of this predicted probability
as the measure of SBC, so this measure takes on a higher value if hospitals face softer
budget constraints. For ease of interpretation and to be consistent with the pro￿t margin
15measures used by prior literature, we convert this continuous measure of SBC into a 5-level
index by taking the quintiles of the continuous variable. The quintiles of the SBC measure
will become the key independent variables in the second stage analysis of hospital access
and quality. The identi￿cation variables for SBC are essentially the four internal ￿nancial
health variables, the demand for health care, and the three external ￿nancial environment
variables (i.e., these variables are not included in the second stage models).
4.2.2 Analysis of Safety Net Service Survival
De￿ning Dependent Variables. Our service survival analysis focuses on services that
are commonly viewed as safety net services. Based on IOM (2000) and Zuckerman et al
(2001), the safety net services we investigate include inpatient substance abuse services,
outpatient substance abuse services, HIV/AIDS treatment, and emergency department.4
One limitation of AHA data is that there are missing values over the years, especially toward
the later years. When hospitals did not report whether they o⁄ered a service in a given year,
we impute the values using information from one year before the missing year (for example,
if a hospital is missing a 1992 value but reported having a given service in 1991 and 1993,
we would impute 1992 as having such a service).
Because we are essentially estimating a duration model, we need to track when hospitals
start and stop o⁄ering each service. With the cleaned AHA data, we construct adoption and
exit variables for each of the services. We use the adoption de￿nition in Baker and Phibbs
(2002)￿ we de￿ne the adoption year as the ￿rst year of the ￿rst consecutive pair of years in
which the hospital says it o⁄ers a given service. Using this de￿nition is more conservative
than de￿ning the adoption year as the ￿rst year that a hospital says it o⁄ers a given service,
since it minimizes sporadic reporting errors. Because the data series starts in 1990, if a
hospital reports having a given service in both 1990 and 1991, then the adoption year would
4There are other safety net services (such as burn units and neonatal intensive care) that we exclude
because we do not have enough sample size to analyze the shut down decisions of these services (neonatal
intensive care, for example, requires such a high sunk cost that hospitals rarely shut it down).
16be 1990. Exit years are de￿ned using the following logic: (1) there must be an adoption year
between 1990 and 2003; (2) the exit year is the year after the last year in which the hospital
o⁄ers a given service. Because we use the more conservative adoption de￿nition, this means
that the earliest exit occurs in 1992 (while the earliest adoption year is 1990).
Statistical Methods. To estimate the e⁄ect of a hospital￿ s expected overall ￿nancial
health on the hazard of safety net service shut down, we limit our hospitals to only those that
are in continuous operation between 1990 and 20005 and did not change ownership during
this period. Since the proportional hazard framework is nonparametric, we do not have to
assume a priori whether the exit rate distribution has a positive or negative dependence on
time. Since not all hospitals are at risk of shutting down a given service, only those who
have adopted the service are included in the hazard model. Speci￿cally, all hospitals that
already o⁄ered the service by 1990 will enter the model in 1990. If a hospital did not adopt
a service until 1994, then it does not enter the hazard model of exit rate until 1994. If a
hospital never o⁄ered a service, then it is not included in the model.
We de￿ne 14 intervals during which we can observe service exit. Suppose a hospital
adopted a given service in year t0. Then intervals (t0;t2] , (t2;t3], (t3;t4], and so on capture
hospitals that o⁄ered a given service in the beginning year of that interval but dropped the
service by the end year of the interval. Hospitals that adopted a service during the study
period but did not drop that service by the end of 2005 will be censored at 2005. Note that
for hospitals that adopted a given service after 1990, there will be fewer than 14 intervals.
The probability that hospital i drops service j given that service j was o⁄ered up until time
t is described by the following hazard function:




￿1jFINit + ￿2jOWNit + ￿3jXit
￿￿
￿0j (t); (6)
5If a hospital appears in both 1990 and 2000, we assume it is in continuous operation during this period.
17where ￿0j (t) is the baseline hazard rate for service j, which di⁄ers by the four Census re-
gions; FINit measures the hospital￿ s ￿nancial health (de￿ned below); OWNit is a categorical
variable that captures hospital ownership (for-pro￿t, government; with not-for-pro￿t as the
reference group); and Xit is a vector of hospital and market characteristics, including system
membership, urban indicator, hospital competition, case mix index, hospital size (as mea-
sured by inpatient discharges and outpatient visits), county population, per capita income,
and percent for-pro￿t and government hospitals within a 15-mile radius.
In the ￿rst model, the variable FINit is quintiles of the SBC measure as de￿ned in the
￿rst stage. The lowest quintile (i.e., hospitals facing the hardest budget constraints) serve
as the reference group. In the second model, for comparison purposes, we use quintiles of
average pro￿t margin as a measure of FIN. Using the quintiles instead of the continuous
version of the variables allow us to capture possible nonlinear relationships between ￿nancial
health and service survival, as well as easier interpretation of the results.
The primary coe¢ cient of interest is ￿1j, which tests Proposition 1 and captures the
e⁄ect of ￿nancial health on the hazard of exit for the jth service. The coe¢ cients can be
estimated using discrete-time proportional hazard models originally proposed by Prentice
and Gloeckler (1978). We allow the baseline hazard rate to vary by the four Census regions.
In presenting the results, we use hazard ratios instead of the actual coe¢ cients for ease of
interpretation: Since a higher value of SBC indicates a softer budget constraint, a hazard
ratio below 1 indicates a lower risk of exit for hospitals with softer budget constraints,
compared to hospitals facing harder budget constraints.
In all survival model estimations involving SBC measures, we obtain the standard er-
rors by bootstrapping methods. In particular, we estimate the two stages jointly in 1000
bootstrap replications and compute the standard errors based on the 1000 bootstrap samples.
184.2.3 Analysis of AMI Mortality Rates
De￿ning Dependent Variables. For the AMI mortality analysis, we examine 30-day, 90-
day, and 1-year mortality rates from the Medicare fee-for-service population. The aggregated
hospital-speci￿c outcome measures were constructed and supplied by Jonathan Skinner at
Dartmouth College. These measures were derived from patient-level regressions that include
hospital indicators and fully interacted patient demographic covariates (￿ve age groups,
gender, race, and urban or rural residence) as well as 17 comorbidity measures to control for
severity of the illness (full details are described in Skinner and Staiger, 2008). In other words,
instead of using the actual percentage of patients who die in each hospital as the outcome
measures, we use these hospital intercepts obtained from the patient-level regressions. These
hospital intercepts represent the mean value of outcomes for each hospital holding patient
characteristics constant across all hospitals. These hospital-speci￿c outcome measures are
normalized so that the average value is zero for each year. For example, a 0.01 mortality
rate would indicate that the mortality rate for such a hospital is 1 percentage point above
the average hospital in that given year.
Statistical Methods. We estimate the relationship between the ￿nancial measures and
AMI mortality rates using the following model:
Qijt = ￿0jt + ￿1jFINit + ￿2jOWNijt + ￿3jXijt + ￿ijt; (7)
where Qijt is the AMI mortality outcome j in hospital i at year t; and the rest of the
independent variables are de￿ned the same way as in the service survival models. We
estimate this equation using the generalized least square (GLS) method (Greene 2003; Shen







19where G is a JT x JT diagonal block variance-covariance matrix of the disturbance vector,
￿, where each block is a T x T variance-covariance matrix corresponding to an individual
hospital. The matrix G follows a non-stationary ￿rst-order autoregression structure (AR1),
and is weighted according to how noisy the quality measure is for a given hospital (a larger
hospital, as measured by the total AMI admissions, gets more weight because outcome
measures are less noisy in a bigger hospital than in a smaller hospital). As with the service




In Table 2, we provide the descriptive statistics of study variables for the whole sample, as
well as by SBC category (Appendix A1 presents the results of our ￿rst stage estimation upon
which the SBC categories are based). Hospitals in di⁄erent SBC categories are quite di⁄erent
along many dimensions. In describing the results, we focus our comparison on hospitals
in the hardest and the softest budget constraint categories (<20th percentile and >80th
percentile of the SBC index). Not surprisingly, hospitals in the softest budget constraint
category have higher pro￿t margins (0.03 compared to -0.11 for hospitals facing the hardest
budget constraints). They are less likely to be for-pro￿t (only 4 percent compared to 20
percent in the lowest SBC category) but are more likely to be part of a system (60 percent vs.
39 percent). They tend to be located in more concentrated markets (Her￿ndahl index 0.41
compared to 0.3), and are much larger hospitals (as measured by total inpatient discharges
and outpatient visits). Hospitals in the softest budget constraint category also have a better
external ￿nancial environment: the county property tax per capita is almost $900 compared
to $718 among hospitals in the lowest SBC category. However, per capita income is quite
20comparable across the SBC categories.
Figure 1 compares the cumulative survival probability of outpatient substance abuse ser-
vices by SBC categories and by pro￿t margin categories. By default, all hospitals start
with 100 percent survival probability at time t0. Figure 1 illustrates that our SBC met-
ric indeed measures something di⁄erent from the hospital￿ s average pro￿t margin over the
studied period. The cumulative survival probability of outpatient substance abuse services
is higher in hospitals with the lowest pro￿t margins (<20th percentile, solid line) than those
in the highest pro￿t margin category (>80th percentile, dashed line). Even though higher
pro￿t is associated with softer budget constraints as Table 2 shows, the survival probability is
higher in hospitals with the softest budget constraints (>80th percentile of SBC distribution,
dashed line) than those with the hardest budget constraints (<20th percentile, solid line).6
This ￿nding is nevertheless completely consistent with our conceptual framework: hospitals
may achieve higher pro￿ts by shutting down unpro￿table safety net services (a form of cost
control). However, cost control is lower (and service survival higher) among those hospitals
which are ￿too big to fail￿in the sense of rationally expecting continued operations even if
pro￿ts are low.
Figure 2 shows the normalized risk adjusted AMI 1-year mortality rates between 1994-
2004 by the same categories of ￿nancial health as in Figure 1. In this case, hospitals with
higher pro￿t and facing softer budget constraints have lower mortality rates than hospitals
with low pro￿t margins and hard budget constraints. As Proposition 2 highlights, the impact
of SBCs on quality is theoretically ambiguous. Finding that SBCs improve service survival,
as noted above, suggests that cost control on both observable and unobservable dimensions,
which can compromise quality, may be considerably more aggressive in hospitals facing
harder budget constraints. If the magnitude of this quality-shaving e⁄ect is strong enough,
a SBC is protective of noncontractible quality, as we ￿nd in Figure 2.
6Figures from other services show similar patterns and are available upon request.
215.2 E⁄ect of Financial Health on Hospital Access and Quality
Tables 3 and 4 present the estimation results for the ￿nancial measures of equations (6) and
(7), respectively. The full results for all outcomes are presented in Appendix A2 (for safety
net services) and A3 (for AMI mortality). The top panel of Table 3 presents the results from
using the SBC index as the ￿nancial health proxy, and the bottom panel presents the results
using pro￿t margin; likewise for Table 4.
Analysis of Safety Net Services. For the service survival analysis, we present the esti-
mation results as hazard ratios. Take the comparison between hospitals in the lowest and
the highest SBC category, for example. The hazard ratio is the ratio of the hazard rate
between these two groups, where the hazard rate is the probability that service j will be
dropped in year t + 1 given that it was provided in year t. The reference group (hospitals
facing the hardest budget constraint) has a hazard ratio of 1 by default. A statistically
signi￿cant hazard ratio below one indicates a lower risk of service shut down in the softest
SBC categories compared with the reference group. The ￿rst column shows that the hazard
rate of shutting down inpatient substance abuse treatment decreases as hospitals move up
the soft budget constraint categories. For example, the hazard of shutting down this service
is 0.65 lower in hospitals with the 2nd softest SBC index (p<0.10) compared to the reference
group, and is 0.56 lower in hospitals with the softest budget constraint (p<0.05). This
pattern is observed in the other 3 safety net services as well.
The SBC index is not merely capturing standard ￿nancial health measures such as pro￿t
margin. When we replace the SBC measure with the pro￿t margin categories in the bottom
panel, we observe the opposite e⁄ect. In general, hospitals with higher pro￿t margins are
more likely to shut down safety net services, perhaps as a way to protect their pro￿t margins.
The SBC also is not merely capturing ownership di⁄erences, but appears independently to
explain some of the variation between and within ownership forms.7
7Hospital ownership is not a signi￿cant predictor in the ￿rst stage estimation of the SBC index. Appendix
22Analysis of Mortality Rates. For the mortality analysis, we present the estimation
results as coe¢ cients. The ￿rst column of Table 4 shows that 30-day mortality rates are
0.5 percentage point lower in hospitals with SBC in the 20-40th percentile compared to the
reference group, hospitals with the hardest budget constraints. The magnitude increases
by the SBC percentiles: the 30-day mortality is 1 percentage point lower in hospitals with
the softest budget constraints (SBC>80th percentile) compared to the reference group. In
all 3 mortality rates examined, the mortality rates decrease as hospitals move up the SBC
categories (with the largest decrease in mortality when hospitals move out of the lowest
quintile, that is, away from being on the margin of closure). All coe¢ cients are statistically
signi￿cant at the 0.01 level. The bottom panel of Table 4 shows a similar pattern when we
replace the SBC measure with pro￿t margin quintiles, although the magnitude is slightly
smaller for 30-day and 90-day mortality rates. Similar to the safety net service results, the
SBC also is not merely capturing ownership di⁄erences: all three mortality rates are higher in
for-pro￿t and government hospitals, by about 1 percentage point, compared to not-for-pro￿t
hospitals after we control for SBC.
Sensitivity Analysis. Our results appear to be stable under various alternative speci￿ca-
tions. One potential problem with the hazard model is that the results might be driven by
di⁄erences between early and late adopters of the services (since we do not observe hospitals
before 1990). If the timing of adoption varies systematically across the ￿nancial health cat-
egories, the results regarding SBC impact on service shut down would be confounded with
the timing of service adoption. There is no known analytical solution to this problem, but
to test the sensitivity of our results, we re-estimate equation (6) by including an indicator
for early adopter, which takes on the value of 1 if the hospital already o⁄ered a given service
A2 shows that conditional on the level of the SBC index, for-pro￿t hospitals have higher hazard of shutting
down most of the safety net services than not-for-pro￿t hospitals do (the hazard rate of for-pro￿t hospitals
is 1.2-2.18 times higher than that of not-for-pro￿t hospitals). Government and not-for-pro￿t hospitals have
comparable hazards of shutting down safety net services, with the exception of inpatient substance abuse
treatment where not-for-pro￿t hospitals have the lowest hazard of shutting this service down. For more
discussion focusing on ownership di⁄erences, see Shen and Eggleston (2008).
23by 1990 and 0 otherwise. Our results are stable under this alternative speci￿cation. An-
other limitation is that service variables are self-reported in the AHA surveys, so one might
be concerned with data reliability. However, there is no reason to believe that reporting
errors would be correlated with the budget softness indicator. To the extent that reporting
errors might be correlated with hospital closure (poorer record keeping when facing ￿nancial
hardship), limiting the sample to those that are in continuous operation could minimize this
potential bias. We investigate whether our results are sensitive to this exclusion criteria by
including all hospitals in an alternative estimation. Our results for both sets of analyses
remain similar. Not surprisingly, the estimated e⁄ect of SBC is slightly larger in the safety
net survival analysis when we also include hospitals that closed between 1990 and 2000.
Our sample of AMI hospitals is skewed toward larger hospitals (since only hospitals with
at least 20 AMI admissions are included). We try to assess the magnitude of the bias in
the SBC e⁄ect due to this exclusion criteria by estimating the model separately for larger
hospitals (those with at least 100 AMI admissions on average) and smaller hospitals (those
with fewer than 100 AMI admissions). We noted that the magnitude of the SBC e⁄ect does
not di⁄er by the size of the hospitals after we control for volumes in the model. Lastly, we
also test the stability of our results by giving equal weights to all hospitals, large or small.
Again, the results remain stable under this alternative estimation.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce the concept of SBC (Kornai 1986) as an alternative ￿nancial
measure of a hospital￿ s overall ￿nancial health and o⁄er an initial estimate of the empirical
e⁄ect of SBCs on hospital access and quality. SBCs measure whether an organization can
expect to be bailed out or to be left to fail if it consistently underperforms. Our conceptual
model predicts that hospitals facing softer budget constraints will be associated with less
aggressive cost control, and thus less likely to discontinue o⁄ering safety-net services. SBCs
24are predicted to be protective of quality when SBCs signi￿cantly impact cost control and
there is large scope for damage to quality from noncontractible aspects of cost control. Our
empirical ￿nding that SBCs are associated with service o⁄erings upholds the ￿rst prediction.
We test the second prediction using heart attack mortality as an aspect of quality that might
be particularly appropriate for revealing any quality-shaving cost control.
The contrasting results for SBC compared to pro￿t margins in Figure 1 and Tables 3
and 4 clearly show that the SBC metric, de￿ned as the inverse of the expected probability of
hospital closure, captures not just a hospital￿ s immediate ￿nancial situation but in some sense
the ￿expected￿longer-run e⁄ect. However, it is important to acknowledge the di¢ culty in
establishing a clear empirical metric for softness of budget constraints, since there is little
available data to capture exogenous variation. Our identi￿cation of the SBC metric comes
from three sources: a hospital￿ s internal ￿nancial health, external ￿nancial environment, and
demand for health care. Even though the per capita property tax appears to be positively
associated with softer budget constraints, there is little di⁄erence in percent elderly across
the SBC categories (Table 2). Future work to re￿ne the empirical SBC measure would
further our understanding of the role of SBCs in the health care industry.
With this caveat in mind, our results still reveal some interesting and policy relevant
insights. Even though a higher pro￿t margin is positively correlated with softer budget
constraints, softer budget constraints are associated with a lower probability of shutting down
safety net services, whereas a higher pro￿t margin is associated with a higher probability
of shutting down safety net services (with the exception of emergency departments). The
service survival results are consistent with the theoretical prediction that hospitals are more
likely to maintain unpro￿table services when facing softer budget constraints, because of the
dampened incentive to engage in cost control innovations.
SBCs and pro￿t margins have similar e⁄ects on AMI mortality rates, although the SBC
e⁄ect has a slightly larger magnitude than the pro￿t margin e⁄ect. The mortality analysis,
testing Proposition 2, suggests that the dampened incentive for cost innovation as a result of
25a SBC (i.e., less zealous cost control) appears to outweigh the dampening e⁄ect on quality
improvement innovation. This ￿nding suggests that health care may be an area for which
the scope for quality-damaging cost control is particularly large, and the inability to specify,
monitor and enforce all aspects of quality should be an important consideration for policies
that impact health care contracting and organization.
In addition, although not the focus of this paper, it is interesting to note that SBCs
and hospital ownership explain di⁄erent aspects of hospital operations: after controlling for
softness of budget constraints, for-pro￿ts continue to have a higher hazard of shutting down
some safety net services, and for-pro￿t and government hospitals continue to have higher
mortality rates compared to not-for-pro￿t hospitals (Appendix A2 and A3). Future work
to explore how SBCs di⁄er across ownership forms and how e⁄ects may spill over among
hospitals in a given market would be valuable, allowing insight into the "black box" of
hospital performance di⁄erences.
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29Table 1. Theory of soft budget constraints and innovations:
Timeline and Payoffs
Date Decisions Manager M: U Owners and Payers: V
0 Contract for basic service package Po − Co Bo − Po
0.5 M invests in innovations e and i −e − i
1 Renegotiation over potential surplus, S Agree to receive mS Agree to 1 − mS
1.5
Implementation effort a,
successful with probability a
−a
2
Divide S or, if implementation fails,
continue with probability 
amS  Uo 
1 − U0  1 − UL
a1 − mS  Vo 










Operating profit margin 0.01 -0.11 0.01 0.03
(1.05) (0.15) (0.14) (1.24)
Not-for-profit ownership 0.63 0.49 0.64 0.73
(0.48) (0.50) (0.48) (0.44)
For-profit ownership 0.11 0.20 0.11 0.04
(0.32) (0.40) (0.32) (0.19)
Government ownership 0.26 0.31 0.25 0.23
(0.44) (0.46) (0.43) (0.42)
Member of a hospital system 0.47 0.39 0.43 0.60
(0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.49)
Urban location 0.52 0.53 0.56 0.43
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Hospital Herfindahl index 0.35 0.30 0.35 0.41
(0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11)
Medicare casemix index 1.26 1.18 1.26 1.32
(0.23) (0.21) (0.23) (0.27)
Total inpatient discharges 7011 3167 6440 12173
(71453) (4026) (6480) (160431)
Total outpatient visits 97763 43718 82956 171005
(138577) (58821) (96327) (209393)
Market Characteristics
County property tax per capita 770.71 718.14 731.49 895.02
(538.58) (434.55) (427.07) (754.46)
County population 592277 924415 503567 387988
(1505253) (2131338) (1276729) (960154)
County per capita income 23336 23341 22911 23794
(8143) (7573) (7362) (9640)
County percent elderly (>64) 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.14
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
% for-profit hospitals within 15-mile radius 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.06
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.15)
% government hospitals within 15-mile radius 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.03
(0.14) (0.17) (0.15) (0.10)
Hospital wage index 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.97
(0.18) (0.19) (0.17) (0.17)
Observations 50864 8881 10237 9998
By SBC Categories
1
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Study Variables By Soft Budget Constraints Categories 
1990-2005
Standard deviations in parentheses













By Soft Budget Constraints Categories
SBC <20th percentile 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
(reference group)
SBC 20-40th percentile 0.93 0.88 0.88 0.72
(0.20) (0.18) (0.15) (0.15)
SBC 40-60th percentile 0.89 0.82 0.70* 0.73
(0.19) (0.15) (0.12) (0.17)
SBC 60-80th percentile 0.65+ 0.69+ 0.76 0.49*
(0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14)
SBC > 80th percentile 0.57* 0.52** 0.57* 0.52*
(0.15) (0.12) (0.13) (0.17)
By Profit Margin Categories
Profit margin <20th percentile 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
(reference group)
Profit margin 20-40th percentile 1.52* 0.97 1.11 0.83
(0.26) (0.15) (0.17) (0.15)
Profit margin 40-60th percentile 1.30 1.11 1.21 0.72+
(0.24) (0.17) (0.18) (0.14)
Profit margin 60-80th percentile 1.49* 1.06 1.28 0.56**
(0.27) (0.17) (0.20) (0.13)
Profit margin > 80th percentile 1.53* 1.52* 1.43* 0.77
(0.28) (0.25) (0.22) (0.16)
Observations 5863 9327 11639 43981
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Year dummies and Census region dummies are included
For SBC estimates, standard errors based on 1000 Bootstrap samples
Service Survival (1990-2005)
Hospital sample includes all general, acute, short-stay hospitals that are in continuous operation 
between 1990 and 2000Table 4. Effect of Soft Budget Constraint on AMI Mortality Rates
Coefficients (bootstrapped SE) 30-day 90-day 1-year
By Soft Budget Constraints Categories
SBC <20th percentile -- -- --
(reference group)
SBC 20-40th percentile -0.005* -0.006** -0.007**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
SBC 40-60th percentile -0.009** -0.010** -0.010**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
SBC 60-80th percentile -0.010** -0.011** -0.011**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
SBC > 80th percentile -0.010** -0.012** -0.011**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
By Profit Margin Categories
Profit margin <20th percentile -- -- --
(reference group)
Profit margin 20-40th percentile -0.003** -0.003** -0.005**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Profit margin 40-60th percentile -0.007** -0.008** -0.010**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Profit margin 60-80th percentile -0.005** -0.007** -0.010**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Profit margin > 80th percentile -0.007** -0.008** -0.011**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 20209 20209 20209
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Year dummies and Census region dummies are included
For SBC estimates, standard errors based on 1000 Bootstrap samples
AMI Mortality (1994-2004)
Hospital sample includes all general, acute, short-stay hospitals that are in continuous 
operation between 1990 and 2000Variables Coefficients
Financial characteristics
Indicator for reporting negative net income in current year 0.625**
(0.095)
Indicator for reporting negative net income in previous year 0.475**
(0.089)
Operating margin in current year -0.408**
(0.152)









Indicator for urban location 0.235
(0.144)
Indicator for hospital system membership -0.280**
(0.087)
Log(hospital herfindahl index) -0.159
(0.144)
Log (hospital case mix index) 0.776*
(0.306)
Log(total inpatient discharges) -0.189**
(0.048)
Log(total outpatient visits) -0.194**
(0.049)
Log(hospital wage index) 1.341**
(0.459)
Market characteristics
Property tax per capita (county level) -0.0003+
(0.0002)
Property tax per capita X for-profit ownership 0.0001
(0.0002)
Property tax per capita X government ownership -0.0003
(0.0002)




Log(per capita income) -0.104
(0.282)
% for-profit hospitals within 15-mile radius -0.126
(0.294)





Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Appendix A1. Estimating Probability of Hospital Closure To Capture Softness of 
Budget ConstraintsAppendix A2. Full Model Results on Effect of Soft Budget Constraint on Hazard Ratio of Service Exit (1990-2005)









SBC <20th percentile -- -- -- --
(reference group)
SBC 20-40th percentile 0.93 0.88 0.88 0.72
(0.20) (0.18) (0.15) (0.15)
SBC 40-60th percentile 0.89 0.82 0.70* 0.73
(0.19) (0.15) (0.12) (0.17)
SBC 60-80th percentile 0.65+ 0.69+ 0.76 0.49*
(0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14)
SBC > 80th percentile 0.57* 0.52** 0.57* 0.52*
(0.15) (0.12) (0.13) (0.17)
For-profit hospital 1.20 1.36+ 1.29 2.18**
(0.23) (0.25) (0.23) (0.45)
Government hospital 1.34+ 1.03 1.11 1.20
(0.23) (0.18) (0.14) (0.23)
Indicator for hospital system membership 1.20 1.06 1.27* 1.35+
(0.13) (0.12) (0.14) (0.21)
Indicator for urban location 0.78 0.74+ 0.98 1.26
(0.14) (0.12) (0.17) (0.29)
Log(hospital herfindahl index) 0.77 0.84 1.26 0.62+
(0.17) (0.17) (0.25) (0.16)
Log (hospital case mix index) 1.02 0.78 0.14** 0.16**
(0.44) (0.35) (0.06) (0.09)
Log(total inpatient discharges) 0.93 0.98 0.99 0.81*
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09)
Log(total outpatient visits) 1.15 0.89 0.87+ 0.93
(0.11) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08)
Log(hospital wage index) 0.44 0.19** 0.26** 2.00
(0.23) (0.09) (0.13) (1.66)
Log(county population) 0.88+ 0.97 1.00 0.99
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08)
Log(per capita income) 2.55** 2.41** 2.98** 2.08+
(0.64) (0.63) (0.75) (0.77)
% for-profit hospitals within 15-mile radius 0.96 1.64 1.40 2.23+
(0.32) (0.56) (0.46) (1.00)
% government hospitals within 15-mile radius 1.14 0.90 1.08 1.66
(0.48) (0.40) (0.37) (0.73)
Observations 5863 9327 11639 43981
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Year dummies and Census region dummies are included
Standard errors based on 1000 Bootstrap samples
Hospital sample includes all general, acute, short-stay hospitals that are in continuous operation between 1990 and 2000Appendix A3. Full Model Results on Effect of Soft Budget Constraint on AMI Mortality Rates (1994-2004)
Hazard ratio (Bootstrap Standard Errors) 30-day mortality 90-day mortality 1-year mortality
SBC <20th percentile
(reference group) -- -- --
SBC 20-40th percentile -0.005* -0.006** -0.007**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
SBC 40-60th percentile -0.009** -0.010** -0.010**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
SBC 60-80th percentile -0.010** -0.011** -0.011**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
SBC > 80th percentile -0.010** -0.012** -0.011**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
For-profit hospital 0.011** 0.011** 0.009**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Government hospital 0.008** 0.010** 0.013**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Indicator for hospital system membership 0.003* 0.004** 0.004**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Indicator for urban location 0.008** 0.009** 0.008**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Log(hospital herfindahl index) -0.017** -0.026** -0.034**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Log (hospital case mix index) -0.039** -0.056** -0.073**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Log(total inpatient discharges) 0.005** 0.005** 0.004*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Log(total outpatient visits) 0.002* 0.003** 0.004**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log(hospital wage index) -0.012+ -0.010 0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Log(county population) 0.004** 0.005** 0.007**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log(per capita income) -0.024** -0.029** -0.035**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
% for-profit hospitals within 15-mile radius -0.002 -0.004 -0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
% government hospitals within 15-mile radius -0.003 -0.008 -0.008
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Observations 20209 20209 20209
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Year dummies and Census region dummies are included
Standard errors based on 1000 Bootstrap samples
Hospital sample includes all general, acute, short-stay hospitals that are in continuous operation between 1990 and 
2000